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Book Reviews
renewals of the MFA tended in a more protective direction. Up until the most recent renegotiation in 1986, the restrictive effect of the MFA
has been partially offset by upgrading of the
import bundle. It is important to keep in mind
that the definition of upgrading in the book is
fairly loose and its measurement vague. Upgrading is taken to mean any movement towards
items with higher unit values, ranging from a
shift from textiles to finished apparel as well
as a shift from lower to higher stages of processing within each sector. Strictly speaking, upgrading in the theoretical literature is shown
to occur within the quota-constrained category,
as relative prices within the category change
due to the quota in favor of the relatively more
expensive items, and not simply as the consequence of rising unit values in the data.
The final chapters of the book attempt to
quantify the costs and benefits of U.S. protection of textiles and apparel and simulate the
impact under alternative policy regimes. The
underlying model treats the domestic good as
an imperfect substitute for imports. Results of
the welfare effects depend crucially on estimates of the tariff-equivalents of quotas, elasticities of supply, demand and cross-elasticities
of demand. There is a wealth of "authors' estimates" and simplifying assumptions used.
While the general conclusions regarding the
costliness of protection of the industry are probably robust, I think the actual numbers generated are subject to so many qualifications that
the usefulness to policy makers is diminished.
I would have preferred a less ambitious but
better specified and more rigorous approach
to the empirical estimation undertaken. For instance, the phenomenon of upgrading has been
emphasized at various points in the book and
yet in analyzing the welfare effect it is not taken
into account. In part, this is due to the poor
measure of upgrading used. A more precise empirical measure of quality is essential to more
correctly determine the effective price rise, the
extent of substitution away from imports and
consumer welfare loss with quotas.
The proposed adjustment scheme is one of
gradual liberalization with the conversion of
quotas into "tariff rate quotas" (an additional
tariff imposed when imports exceed a specific
volume) in the initial phase followed by the
gradual reduction or elimination of tariff protection. Any revenue generated by quotas would
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be channeled to a program of adjustment assistance aimed at retraining and relocating displaced workers. The proposal has many positive
aspects. In particular by phasing out special
protection and aiding displaced workers rather
than firms, the industry would gradually be
downsized and investments in a declining industry discouraged. However, the focus on
helping displaced workers and not firms certainly does nothing to reduce the political pressure for protection from the inframarginal firms,
among whom the greatest resistance to change
is organized. It is often the interest of these
firms that dominate the political process leading
to changes in trade policy. Nevertheless,
Cline's adjustment scheme is closely argued
and well focused.
The key contribution of this book probably
lies in the information and analysis of the distinctions underlying the textile and apparel sector. This information should be an important
input for those interested in the political economy underlying the differential protection
granted to each of the two sectors. The scheme
for adjustment proposed by Cline is important
and worth considering. The most controversial
part of the book lies in the quantification of
the effects and projections of the protection
granted. Many of the implications drawn from
the empirical results are subject to important
qualifications and there is a need for caution
and careful analysis before the results can be
applied.
BEE-YAN AW
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Manufacturing matters: The myth of the postindustrial economy. By STEPHEN S. COHEN
AND JOHN ZYSMAN. Council on Foreign Relations Book series. NY: Basic Books, 1987.
Pp. xiv, 297. $19.95. ISBN 0-465-04384-4.
JEL 87-1139
Messrs. Cohen and Zysman are political scientists. They are the resident gurus at BRIE
(Berkeley Roundtable on International Economy). While they doubtless enjoy imported
French cheese, especially with the Zinfandel

122

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXVII {March 1989)

from the local vineyards, they get the goose
pimples watching movies on their Japanese
VCRs. They are worried sick by America's alleged deindustrialization. This book is their effort to say why and to startle a complacement
nation into an active policy to defend its industries.
Economists will want to look at the book since
it has become the bible of the manufacturing
lobby and is also a favorite of the Congressmen
who gave us the retrograde U.S. Trade Bill of
1988. But I should warn them that they will
find the book exceptionally irritating. The reason is that the authors display throughout an
unmitigated scorn for, and an ignorance of,
what economists and their craft have to say
about the matter at hand. It has been aptly
said that familiarity breeds contempt but contempt does not breed familiarity. The unfortunate result is that the authors occasionally engage in unjustified critiques that detract from
their case and will distract the reader.
In particular, trade theorists, whose works
are not cited but who are nonetheless systematically berated, will not be amused to find their
writings and views misstated. E.g., the authors
argue that "The Heckscher-Ohlin theory assumes . . . given factor endowments in each
country" (p. 276), when every graduate student
has read Findlay's classic (1970 Journal of Political Economy) article on endogenizing the
growth of capital and successfril extension of
the theory to the long run. On the normative
side, the authors evidently have not read the
work of Samuelson, Smith, Srinivasan, Dixit
and others on the gains from trade in an intertemporal setting, and continue to EU-gue as if
the theory of commercial policy is wholly static
and inappropriate.
These lapses do not help. But the reader
should be patient, for Cohen and Zysman have
a thesis that is serious. Essentially, they contend that (1) America's manufactures are in
jeopardy; (2) manufactures matter for prosperity; and, therefore, (3) active governmental intervention, including "strategic" trade policy,
is necessary. I am afraid, however, that I am
not persuaded by their arguments.
Thus, faced by Robert Lawrence's compelling
contention that the share of manufactures in
U.S. value-added has remained steady in recent
decades, the authors pour scorn on him and

proceed to look for other evidence that would
justify their fears. Thus, for instance, they ask
the reader to eye-scan charts such as the one
(Figure 5.3) on real wages in manufacturing
which shows a post-OPEC halt, possibly even
a decline—we are unable to determine which
since the authors do not use statistical tests—
and to accept assertions (again without statistical documentation and analysis) that "the price
elasticity of imports has increased " (p. 67), suggesting increased competition. The latter argument will please offended economists as they
proceed to read that "this shift in elasticity helps
account for the failure of the dropping dollar
to bring American trade back towards balance "
(p. 68)! Manufacturing may indeed be in trouble
in the U.S.; but the authors do not provide a
plausible analysis as to how and why.
As for manufactures mattering, the CohenZysman arguments are not more persuasive.
The authors seem to believe in key sectors,
recall historical episodes of growth around industries such as autos, produce French intellectuals in support of the view that we are now
at such a juncture where semiconductors and
hightech must be produced at home to retain
economic prosperity, and cite Japan as an example of a state that has accepted such beliefs,
acted on them and prospered. Economists will
recognize this argument as implicitly one of externalities attached to manufactures (though the
authors, like virtually every noneconomist,
seem wrongly to consider linkages as necessarily implying externalities); they will also recognize that this is one of the hardest arguments
to make empirically convincing.
In fact, the difficulties that Cohen and Zysman face here are familiar to economists since
the deindustrialization thesis is by no means a
novelty to them. Long before the local version
offered by Cohen and Zysman, a British deindustrialization school had made waves. Led by
Nicholas Kaldor, the great Cambridge economist, that school emerged in the same psychological climate as the one that has prevailed in
the U.S. of the 1980s: one of a sense of diminishing greatness as an economic power. The British
school assumed, citing the "Verdoom Law,"
that manufactures were more progressive than
services. Their prescriptions led in turn to Britain adopting for a time the Selective Employment Tax, differentially taxing employment in

Book Reviews
the service sector to propel people into the
manufacturing sector. The case for "reindustrialization" by protection or promotion that was
proposed in Britain was never convincing to
most, though it should be emphasized that
economists bravely tried with patience, a priori
logic and econometrics to test its underlying
premises. I am persuaded that, even if Cohen
and Zysman had tried to emulate these economists, they would have failed equally: the issues
are unusually intractable, and hypotheses and
convictions in this gray area tend to remain
just that.
As for policy intervention, I am glad to note
that the authors are smart in rejecting trade
protection to encourage "reindustrialization":
Robert Reich has preceded them in this move
to a sensible renunciation of protectionism. But
they endorse "strategic" trade policy: a phrase
that is now loosely used by many, experts and
laymen alike, since it sounds like being clever
or pursuing optimality and hence a policy that
surely the "best and the brightest" can only
embrace. As it happens, Cohen and Zysman
mean by it simply monitoring and removing
foreign interventions, trade or domestic, that
give our rivals an artificial advantage in manufacturing production. As with classical infantindustry protection, especially in its KempBardhan version where technical change costlessly accrues from learning by doing, these
interventions may give permanent advantage,
ceteris paribus, even though the interventions
themselves are transitory, and thereby reduce
our level of invaluable manufacturing production. The main problem with this prescription,
as embodied in the 1988 Trade Act, is that the
U.S. would have itself decide whether foreign
rivals enjoy such artificial advantages. Civen
the present "diminished giant" syndrome in the
U.S., the tendency to see such "unfair" practices by our economically successful rivals is
inevitable; and given our strength, our capacity
to confront our politically weaker rivals with
corresponding harassments and to coerce them
into trade-distorting measures such as "voluntary import expansions" (VIEs), where they divert trade from others to the U.S., is considerable. But there is no comprehension of this
and related threats to the postwar international
trading regime to be found in the circles that
feed on a steady diet of prescriptions for a
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"tough," a "strategic," trade policy. I have dealt
with these issues at length in the 1987 Ohlin
Lectures (Bhagwati 1988), while exploring further recent developments in the theory of commercial policy, and their bearing on the question of free trade, in the Harms Prize Lecture
(Bhagwati 1989).
Warts and all, however, this book has the
considerable merit of being relevant, possessing
a clear thesis and an engaging style that the
practitioners of our dismal science can no longer
command and have almost forgotten to value.
It is certainly worth your time, if not your
money.
JAGDISH BHAGWATI

Columbia University
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Privatization: The key to better government.
By E. S. SAVAS. Chatham House Series on
Change in American Politics. Chatham, NJ:
Chatham House, 1987. Pp. xi, 308. $25.00,
cloth; $14.95, paper. ISBN 0-934540-58-6,
pbk.
JEL 88-0516
One of the more intriguing ideas that has
been circulating in political and academic circles in the last two decades concerns the possibility that much of the activity traditionally provided by governments could efficaciously be
given over to the private sector, a notion that
has come to be termed "privatization." This
book is an attempt by one of the more important
scholars of the privatization movement to provide a comprehensive exploration of the potential benefits of the approach. The book is brimful with ideas, many of them worthy of serious
consideration. It is an ambitious project: Savas
covers virtually all services where privatization
could be applied. The broad scope is both a
strength and a weakness however. While the
comprehensiveness is good, there is some sacrifice of depth. Also, Savas is a strong advocate
for privatization of all kinds, which again is both
a strength and a weakness. While it makes for
a lively narrative, at the same time it weakens
the author's credentials as an impartial scholar.

